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Article 2

The Proportionality Test in
Section 1988 Fee Awards
Edward T. Stein*
Linda E. Fisher**
INTRODUCTION

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 19761 was

enacted to attract competent legal counsel for those individuals
and groups seeking redress in federal and state courts for violations of their civil rights.2 The need for the Fees Act was clearly
demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court's historic decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.3 In
Alyeska, the Supreme Court disallowed an award of fees to the
plaintiffs' attorneys, 4 rejected the developing equitable doctrine of
private attorneys general 5 and reaffirmed the established American Rule that parties are to bear their own legal expenses. 6 The

*Partner, Singer & Stein, Chicago, Illinois; B.S. 1964, New York University; Ll.B. 1967,
Brooklyn Law School.
**Associate of Singer & Stein, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. 1976, Macalester College; J.D. 1980,
University of Chicago Law School.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980) [referred to herein as the Fees Act or § 1988]. The Act
provides in pertinent part "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title .... the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs." Id.
2. The coverage includes fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, as well
as fees to a prevailing party, other than the United States, in enforcing or charging a
violation of the United States Internal Revenue Code or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
3. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
4. The attorneys for the environmental groups had logged 4,455 hours during the course
of the litigation which began in 1970. 421 U.S. at 245 n.13.
5. Id. at 245. The appellate court, however, had accepted the concept of private attorneys
general and had made the following comment. "Recognizing their broad equitable power,
some courts have concluded that the interests of justice require fee shifting in a third class of
cases where the plaintiff acted as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority." Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026,
1029 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citation omitted).
6. 421 U.S. at 270-71. For a good discussion and critique of the American Rule, see
Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 636 (1973). Samuel R. Berger points out in his outstanding article, Court Awarded
Attorneys Fees: What is "Reasonable?,"126 U. PA. L. REV. 281,295 (1977), that the Supreme
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Court reasoned that, without statutory authorization and guidelines, the problems in implementing the judgemade equitable doctrine were too great.7 A close reading of Justice White's majority
opinion in Alyeska, however, indicates that the Court was critical
of the American Rule as well. The Court recognized that "under
some, if not most, of the statutes providing the allowance of reasonable fees, Congress has opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement public policy and to allow counsel fees so as to
encourage private litigation."
In keeping with this attitude, Congress passed section 1988 (or
the Fees Act) 9 specifically to provide statutory authorization for
attorney's fees. 10 Although a considerable amount of civil rights
litigation has ensued since the effective date of the Fees Act," a
consistent body of law providing for the objective and uniform
measurement of fees has not developed among, or even within, the
circuits.12 In determining what fees are reasonable, certain federal

circuits have borrowed standards previously used in employment
discrimination and antitrust cases, 13 while others have derived
their own "reasonable fee" test from a variety of sources. 14

Court did not abolish the courts' equitable powers in this area entirely: "[F]ederal courts
must derive their authority from one of two distinct sources: (1) the historic equity power of
the courts to impose fee obligations in certain definable circumstances, or (2) a statute
authorizing or mandating fee awards." To be sure, awarding fees in civil rights cases was not
one of the "historically recognized situations." See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 84
F.R.D. 246, 255-62 (N.D. Ill. 1979) for a discussion of fee awards based upon the court's
"historic equity power" in common fund cases.
7. 421 U.S. at 263-64.
8. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980).
10. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report],
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD_ NEWS 5908. Section 1988 authorizes fees to
prevailing defendants; however, such fees are available only when plaintiffs claim or
claims are meritless or frivolous. See infra text accompanying notes 59-62. This article is
directed to the recovery of fees by prevailing plaintiffs.
11. The Fees Act was effective in 1976. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 historical note (West Supp.
1981).
12. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. See also Leubsdorf, The Contingency
Factorin Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 503 (1981).
13. See, e.g., Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), an employment discrimination decision).
For a discussion of the Johnson case, see infra notes 15-16. See also Hughes v. Repko, 578
F.2d 483, 485 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1976), an antitrust case).
14. See e.g., Mid-Hudson Legal Serv., Inc. v. G & U Inc., 578 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1978),
following the Third Circuit's Lindy Bros. antitrust calculation. The Lindy Bros. test, or
lodestar formula, arrives at the award by multiplying the hours expended by a "community"
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In addition, some circuits have failed to follow one standard
exclusively. The Seventh Circuit, for instance, employed one formula in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works 15 which multiplied the
attorney's billing rate by the time or labor expended and adjusted
the figure to account for certain factors, such as the customary fee

billing rate. The lodestar figure is narrowly adjusted (usually up if at all) by contingency
and/or quality factors. Cf. Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1978), which borrowed
the Fifth Circuit's employment discrimination factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). See infra note 15 for a description of that
test. See generally E. LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES (1981).
The Sixth Circuit, relying on the Lindy Bros. formula, ultimately adopted a strict market
rate times hours formula. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980). The only variation in the Sixth Circuit's formula was the
provision for a contingent factor of up to 10%. See also Comment, Flexibility and Fairness-Sixth Circuit Jurisprudence Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 12 TOLEDO
L. REv. 623 (1981).
15. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). Initially the circuit did
not use the Waters fee analysis in § 1988 cases. In Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th
Cir. 1979), rev'd in part,446 U.S. 754 (1980), the Seventh Circuit relied on the factors set forth
in Johnson,488 F.2d at 717-19, and reaffirmed this reliance in Entertainment Concepts, Inc.
III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497,508 (7th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit's Johnson factors are:
1) The time and labor required;
2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions presented;
3) The skill required to perform the legal services;
4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case;
5) The customary fee in the community;
6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
7) Time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances;
8) The amount involved and the results obtained;
9) The experience, reputation and ability of the attorney;
10) The undesirability of the case;
11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
12) Awards in similar cases.
488 F.2d at 717-19. In Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1980), however, the
court used the Waters factors, derived from the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, as a substitute for the Johnson factors. The relevant rule reads as follows:
Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following: 1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services
properly; 2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 3) The fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 4) The amount
involved and the results obtained; 5) The time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances; 6) The nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; 7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; 8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Waters, 502 F.2d at 1322. The ABA standards begin with the lodestar formula set forth by
the Third Circuit in Lindy Bros., see supra note 14. Practically speaking, it may make little
difference which set of factors is used because the lists are "practically identical."
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in the locality, the amount involved and the results obtained. 16 Six
years later in Muscare v. Quinn,17 the Seventh Circuit adopted a
proportionality test under which attorney's fees can be awarded
only for specific claims on which the plaintiff actually prevails. All
other attorney time, including that spent pursuing claims which
seemed substantial and meritorious when brought, is discounted
and is not compensable. The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in
Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Manufacturing Co.,1 8 however, left
open the question of whether the court may apply both tests in a
single case.' 9 Such an approach would permit a double reduction
of fees and would, therefore, discourage attorneys from participating in civil rights litigation, in contravention of the clear intent of
20
Congress.
This article analyzes the congressional intent underlying section
1988 which the authors believe demands that fees be awarded for
all time reasonably spent, regardless of the plaintiffs failure to
prevail on certain issues or claims. 2' The article will examine the
legislative and case history of section 1988, particularly the development of the Seventh Circuit's proportionality test. In addition,
we will consider Hensley v. Eckerhart,22 currently pending before

Entertainment Concepts v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d at 508; In re Folding Carton Antitrust
Litig., 84 F.R.D. at 259.
16. See supra note 15.
17. 614 F2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980).
18. 665 F.2d 149(7th Cir. 1981).
19. In applying the Waters standards, the district court had reduced the hours by half.
The court then reduced the remaining hours by 65% based on its interpretation of Muscare.
Syvock, 665 F.2d at 162. See infra text accompanying notes 118-31 for a discussion of the
Syvock case.
20. Congress' initial intent was in part to bridge the gap between too few civil rights
attorneys and too many citizens whose rights had been violated. 122 CONG. REC. 31,472,
33,312 (1976).
21. Lawyers are bound to represent their clients zealously and to avoid possible conflicts
of interest. However, conflicts do arise when the questions of relief on the merits of a case
and attorney's fees are negotiated concurrently. The attorney is then placed on the
proverbial horns of a dilemma. The attorney becomes both an advocate for his/her client
and for himself or herself. More important is the fact that attorneys are bound to "vigorous
advocacy." This necessarily requires creativity, expanding new areas of law, and bringing
new theories and approaches to the court. The proportionality test (see infra text accompanying notes 88-96) penalizes these good faith efforts. Certainty in assessment of fees and the
expectation of receiving all fees reasonably due reduces the breadth of negotiability on these
issues, relieving the attorney of most of the potential conflict. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n on
Settlement offers in Public Interest Litigation Conditioned on Waiver of Statutory Fees, Op.
80-94 (1981).
22. 102 S. Ct. 1610 (1982). For a discussion of Hensley, see infra text accompanying notes
132-50.
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the Supreme Court, which presents the Court with its first opportunity to decide the propriety of the proportionality calculus under
section 1988. Although the facts in Hensley differ significantly
from those in Syvock, the Court's upcoming decision could shed
some light on the problems addressed in this article by establishing an objective measure for fee awards.
THE LEGISLATIVE AND CASE HISTORY OF SECTION 1988
The language of section 1988 provides less than complete direction as to when, how and in what amount fees are to be awarded:
"In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [sections
1981-1983, 1985, 1986]... the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee.

.

."23

To ascertain

the appropriate manner of awarding fees, therefore, it becomes
necessary to look beyond the statute itself. One source of assistance is the legislative history of the provision, evidencing a clear
congressional intent to ensure access to federal courts to citizens
who claim civil rights violations; another is judicial interpretations
of similar legislation. Both will be considered in this section.
Legislative History
Prior to the enactment of section 1988, there were over fifty federal statutes which authorized an award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties.2 4 These statutes generally followed one of three
approaches: some granted mandatory fees to prevailing plaintiffs, 25 others were discretionary but limited fee awards to certain
parties, 26 and numerous other statutes allowed a court, in its discretion, to award fees to either prevailing plaintiffs or defendants.2 7 Section 1988 falls into the latter category. Its language
tracks closely that of section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196428 and section 2000(a)-3(b) of Title II of that Act. 29 These
23.

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980).

24. Presently, there are more than 100 such statutes. See 5 FED. ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS
RPTR 2, 3 (June, 1982).

25. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
26. Privacy Act of 1974,5 U.S.C. § 552 (g)(2XB) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) and Fair Housing
Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. § 3612 (c) (1976).
27. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (e) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S:C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976); and Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415-16
nn.5-7; and Berger, supra note 6, at 303-05.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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three provisions have been construed together and held to require
30
that fees be paid to prevailing parties.
When first enacted, however, the civil rights statutes giving rise
to section 1988 did not allow attorney's fees.3 1 Although some of
these statutes were later amended to provide for fees, many were
not. Consequently, most of the federal civil rights litigation since
the mid-1960's was filed under one of the civil rights statutes which
had no provision for attorney's fees. 32 Lacking statutory authority
in Alyeska, the Supreme Court had little choice but to deny plain33
tiffs' request for fees.
Congress' response to Alyeska was to pass the Fees Act. In so
doing, Congress acknowledged that "[T]he effective implementation of civil rights laws by all citizens" was dependent upon the
awarding of fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 34 Unless fees were granted
the civil rights laws would become "mere hollow pronouncements
which the average citizen [could not] enforce." 35 Moreover, unless
the average citizen did enforce the civil rights laws, the Senate
noted, the financial and administrative burden of enforcement
would devolve upon the federal or state government with a resultant increase in prosecuting attorneys. 36 Fee shifting provisions,
however, would enable "vigorous enforcement of modern civil
rights legislation, [and] at the same time [limit] the growth of the
enforcement bureaucracy." 3 7 Ideally, then, the important principles enunciated in the civil rights acts would be furthered without
cost to federal or state government.

30. See infra text accompanying notes 55-75. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975XTitle II standards equally applicable to Title VII); Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5 (1980)(Christiansburg'sTitle VII standard applied to § 1988). In addition, the Senate
Report on § 1988 states: "It is intended that the standard for awarding fees be generally the
same as under the fee provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." Senate Report, supra note 10,
at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908.

31. Id.
32. "The very first attorneys' fee statute was a civil rights law, the Enforcement Act of
1870, 16 Stat. 140, which provided for attorneys' fees in three separate provisions protecting
voting rights." Senate Report, supra note 10, at 3, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5911.

33. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 3-8.
34. Custom v. Quern, 482 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
35. Senate Report, supra note 10, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5913. Congresswoman Holtzman said, "The act will help to assure that all Americans
can have access to the court to obtain the protection against discrimination contained in our
laws and the Constitution." 122 CONG. REC. 35,127 (1976).
36. Senate Report, supra note 10, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5911.
37. Id.
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Additionally, Congress indicated that section 1988 was designed
so as to allow plaintiffs to seek counsel of their choice through the
same or similar mechanisms that businesses or wealthy individuals use. This goal could be accomplished only if the "reasonable"
fee award was based on the same standards used to award fees in
commercial, antitrust, class action and other federal litigation. 38
Thus, the Senate Report advised that awards be made "as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client," 3 9 that
is, according to a retainer or hourly rate schedule. 40 It is clear from
the Senate debates that contingent fees were not considered
among the "traditional" payment methods.4"
The best interpretation of the Senate's intent, given the cases
cited in the Senate Report, 42 is that fees should reflect the amount
of work actually performed. In other words, a proper calculation
would multiply the attorney's hourly rate by the number of hours
expended, with appropriate adjustment for certain variables.4 3 In
this way awards in civil rights cases would follow the same standards utilized "in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, .. . and not be reduced because the rights involved may be
nonpecuniary in nature." 44 Such an application of the Fees Act
does not provide a windfall to attorneys, but rather compensates
45
them for services rendered.

38. "In computing the fees, counsel for prevailing parties should be paid as is traditional
with attorneys compensated by a fee paying client, 'for all time reasonably expended on a
matter."' Id. at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913 (citing Davis v.
County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974) and Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974)).
39. 122 CONG. REC. 33, 313(1976)
40. The fee arrangement that counsel has with a client should be of no concern to the
court in assessing fees. In Sargeant v. Sharpe, 579 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1978), the court
said: "[W]e reiterate that a fee agreement is irrelevant to the issue of entitlement and should
not enter into a determination of the amount of a reasonable fee." Under the Waters or
Johnson factors, the fee agreement would only be relevant to whether or not the fees are
contingent. If the attorney is being paid by the hour at his or her regular rates, the
contingency factor is irrelevant in awarding fees. It should be considered only in determining
whether a bonus is appropriate. See also Sanchez v. Schwartz, No. 81-2509, slip op. at 4 (7th
Cir. Sept. 13, 1982).
41. See 122 CONG. REc. 33,314 (1976).
42. See Senate Report, supra note 10, at 6, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5913.
43. See supra note 15. If the attorney does not have a "normal" hourly rate then the court
should determine the appropriate rate within the district.
44. Senate Report, supra note 10, at 6, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5913.
45. 122 CONG. REc. 33,314 (1976).
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In order to attract competent legal counsel to participate in civil
rights litigation, the Fees Act promised an award of reasonable
fees. The purpose behind the promise was to afford citizens the
legal "resources" with which to gain access to the courts. Senator
Tunney, a co-sponsor of the Senate Bill, pointed out that "[i]f the
citizen does not have the resources, his day in court is denied him;
the Congressional policy which he seeks to assert and vindicate
goes unvindicated; and the entire Nation, not just the individual
citizen, suffers.
...
46 Congressman Drinan, a co-sponsor- of the
House bill, echoed Senator Tunney's sentiments and added that
"all incidental and necessary expenses incurred in furnishing
effective and competent representation" should be included in an
47
award as well.

As the legislative history indicates, Congress recognized that the
plaintiffs attorney in a civil rights case serves as a private attorney general.48 Congress clearly intended that neither the prevailing plaintiff nor his or her attorney should bear the cost of vindicating federal rights against violators of federal law. 49 Its purpose

in enacting the civil rights laws would remain unfulfilled unless
the means for taking advantage of such laws were also provided.
Since competent "legal resources" are assured only through payment of reasonable fees, promise of payment was a necessary precondition to effective private enforcement of the civil rights laws.
Congress therefore concluded that all plaintiff attorney time should
be compensated unless it is duplicative or spent on frivolous or
meritless claims or issues. 50
In sum, the legislative history espouses the policy that attorneys
should be paid a reasonable fee and should know with certainty
that their good faith efforts will be rewarded fairly. 51 Civil rights
plaintiffs and their attorneys are, after all, the chosen instrument
of Congress and a prevailing plaintiff is a vindicator of federally
created rights. 52 In order to give full meaning to the Fees Act,
46. Id. at 33,313 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 35,123.
48. See Senate Report, supranote 10, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.NEWS
5908,5911.
49. See Senate Report, supra note 10, at 5, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.NEWS
5908, 5912.
50. "[Tlhe term 'meritless' is to be understood as meaning groundless or without
foundation, rather than simply that the plaintiff has ultimately lost his case." Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 421.
51. Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 27, 33 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 57-62.
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however, the concepts of prevailing party and "all time reasonably
spent" must be liberally construed. 53 Thus far, the Supreme Court
has not addressed the question of what fee is reasonable. 54 It has,
however, examined and liberally construed the definition of a prevailing party and the circumstances under which fees may be awarded.
Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court has rendered several decisions under various civil rights statutes which address the broad question of who
is a "prevailing party," and which apply to section 1988 awards.
The earliest relevant case on the subject, Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises,55 announced that prevailing plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust."56 Prevailing defendants,
however, have not received the same treatment. In Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 57 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) sued the defendant company on behalf of an
individual complainant. The defendant moved for and was granted
summary judgment on the ground that the suit had not been
"pending" at the time the amendments to Title VII, which allowed
the EEOC to represent complainants in "pending" cases, took
effect. The lower court denied the prevailing defendant attorney's
fees, however, because the EEOC's action was not meritless. The
Supreme Court approved this result. 58
53. See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9444, at 5047 (C.D.
Cal. 1974). See also the Northcross opinion which declared:
"We know of no 'traditional' method of billing whereby an attorney offers a
discount based upon his or her failure to prevail on 'issues or parts of issues.'
Furthermore, it would hardly further our mandate to use the 'broadest and most
flexible remedies available' to us to enforce the civil rights laws if we were so
directly to discourage innovative and vigorous lawyering in a changing area of
the law. That mandate is best served by encouraging attorneys to take the most
advantageous position on their client's behalf that is possible in good faith."
611 F.2d at 636. Likewise, the authors know of no traditional method of reducing a
prosecutor's salary in proportion to cases or parts of cases lost or won. Nor is there a
traditional method of reducing a judge's compensation when a case is reversed or
remanded. See also Berger, supra note 6, at 316-30.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 132-50 for a discussion of Hensley, now pending
before the Court, which presents one aspect of the reasonable fee question.
55. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). Newman was a Title II case and was cited approvingly in the
Senate Report on § 1988. Senate Report, supra note 10, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5911.
56. 390 U.S. at 402. Fee awards may also be made against a state, as the eleventh
amendment is not bar. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
57. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
58. Id. at 422.
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After analyzing the legislative history underlying the civil
rights statutes involved, the Court held that prevailing defendants
were not entitled to fees on the same basis as prevailing plaintiffs. 59 Congress intended that a prevailing defendant would recover only if the plaintiff's cause was "unfounded, meritless, frivolous or vexatiously brought." 60 In justifying this double standard,
the Court noted that "there are at least two strong equitable considerations" which apply when making an award to a prevailing
plaintiff that are wholly absent when making an award to a prevailing defendant. 6 1 First, the purpose of the civil rights statutes
was to give plaintiffs an opportunity to vindicate violations of
their civil rights; and second, an award to a prevailing plaintiff
was an "award against a violator of federal law." 62 The thrust of
fees awards statutes in the civil rights area was thus aimed at
63
benefiting prevailing plaintiffs.
In Maher v. Gagne,64 the Court was called upon to determine
the meaning of "prevailed" under section 1988. The plaintiff, an
AFDC recipient, brought a section 1983 action against the state of
Connecticut, alleging that certain of its welfare regulations violated the Social Security Act and the fourteenth amendment. The
parties thereafter entered into a consent decree which required
Connecticut to amend its regulations. The district court, nevertheless, awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff, and the award was
affirmed on appeal. The state sought and was granted certiorari in
the Supreme Court. Relying on the Senate Report's statement that
"for purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief," the Court held
that a "prevailing party" under the Fees Act included plaintiffs
whose rights were secured when their case was settled.65 Thus,

59. Id.
60. Id. at 421.
61. ld. at 418.
62. Id.
63. Prevailing defendants are allowed fee awards under § 1988 if the plaintiffs action is
frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.
64. 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
65. Id. at 129 (quoting Senate Report, supra note 10, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912). That fees are awardable when a case is mooted or settled
before trial was approved in Regaldo v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (N.D. Ill. 1978), where
plaintiffs sued for prompt replacement of lost unemployment compensation checks. After
several years of litigation (which was commenced before § 1988 was enacted) the parties
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although the plaintiff in Maherhad not prevailed "in every particular," she had won "substantially all of the relief originally
66
sought" and was, therefore, the prevailing party.
The Court has also examined what claims may give rise to a fees
award. In Maher, the Court stated that "[T]o the extent a plaintiff
joins a claim under one of the statutes enumerated in [section 1988]
with a claim that does not allow attorney fees, that plaintiff, if it
prevails on the non-fee claim, is entitled to a determination on the
other claim for the purpose of awarding counsel fees." 67 Even
where the claim with fees involved a constitutional question and
the non-fee, nonconstitutional claim was dispositive, the court
could decline to reach the constitutional issue and still award fees
to the plaintiff so long as he prevailed on the non-fee claim. 68 Although the Court did not decide whether fees could be awarded for
time spent on both claims, such awards would be fully in keeping
with the tenor of the legislative history as a whole, as well as its
requirement that section 1988 fees be awarded in the traditional
69
manner.
In addition, the Court has held that section 1988 fees may be
awarded in purely statutory actions under section 1983, whether
brought in federal or state court,7 0 as well as for administrative
and state judicial proceedings which are required by federal statute as a precondition to gaining access to the federal courts.7 1
More recently, the Court addressed the issue of whether a request
for attorney's fees under section 1988 is subject to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e), as a motion to alter or amend the judgment.
If so, a request for fees would have to be filed within ten days of
entry of judgment.7 2 The Court determined, in White v. New

settled. The consent decree was silent as to costs and attorneys fees. The plaintiffs petitioned the district court for fees which were granted to the legal aid attorneys. In awarding
fees, the district court rejected all of the defendants' arguments. Id. at 452. Regaldo is an
early case on the question of section 1988 fees and is important not only in its result but for
its insight into the purpose of the Fees Act. The Supreme Court in Maher confirmed Regaldo
in principle.
6. 448 U.S. at 127.
67. Id. at 132-33 (quoting H.R. REP.No.1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7).
68. Id. at 132-33 n.15.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 23-54.
70. The Court has also liberally construed the Act to make it applicable to cases that are
not primarily constitutional in nature. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
71. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
72. Rule 59(e) provides: "A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not
later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."
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Hampshire Department of Social Security,73 that such a requirement was neither "necessary [nor] desirable to promote finality,
74
judicial economy or fairness."
The preceding discussion has demonstrated how the Court, in
construing the Fees Act, has sought to implement the congressional intent to encourage and facilitate the private enforcement of
civil rights laws. Prevailing party has been broadly defined, as
have the actions and proceedings in which fees are awardable
under the Act. When considering how to measure the statutorily
mandated reasonable fee, the same general standard should be
applied to make "it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a
meritorious suit." 75 That general standard has not been uniformly
followed by the circuits, however, and a great disparity in the
ultimate awards for fees has resulted.
THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST

Given the posture of the Supreme Court, the statutory framework and the congressional directive to award fees in the same
manner as fee-paying clients compensate their attorneys, awards
under section 1988 should be made to prevailing parties for all time
spent on reasonably colorable claims whether or not those claims
ultimately succeed. 76 Fees should not be awarded, however, for
time spent on meritless claims, which have been judicially defined
as groundless or without foundation. 77 Thus, the plaintiffs failure
to prevail on a claim does not render the claim meritless. Once the
plaintiff is the adjudicated prevailing party, there should be no
diminution of fees. Rather, fees should be disallowed only when

73. 102 S. Ct. 1162 (1982).
74. Id. at 4257. The Court ruled that Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) applies. That rule contains no
time limitations for when the "prevailing party" must file his or her application for costs.
Many districts provide that costs applications must be filed within a time certain. For
example, rule 45 of the General Rules of the Northern District of Illinois requires the "bill of
costs to be filed" within ten days of the entry of a judgment allowing costs. The Seventh
Circuit has recently decided that the time limitation contained in local rule 45 "has nothing
whatsoever to do with a motion for attorneys fees under Section 1988." Gautreaux v. C.H.A.,
No. 81-2223, slip op. at 18-19 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 1982). See also Metcalf v. Borba, 51 U.S.L.W.
2081 (U.S. Aug. 22, 1982).
75. Carey, 447 U.S. at 63 (quoting Christiansburg,443 U.S. at 420).
76. This assumes that the plaintiff has prevailed on at least one claim and that "special
circumstances" do not exist to deny fees. See e.g., Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.
1980); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911
(1980); Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978); Berger,supra note 6, at 320. See also
infra note 78.
77. Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 421.
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special circumstances, such as bad faith, frivolous claims, or vexatious litigation, warrant it.78 By not discouraging litigation, this
framework effectuates Congress' intent that civil rights plaintiffs
79
act as private attorneys general.
The goal of advancing the underlying litigation has been used
by several circuits as a rationale for awarding fees in cases where
plaintiffs have not prevailed on all claims brought or litigated,
s°
provided that the claims were not frivolous. In Brown v. Bathke
for example, the plaintiff prevailed on her procedural due process
claim, but the court did not reach her substantive claims. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit found that the hours spent by her attorney on substantive issues were compensable because to do otherwise would deter plaintiffs from bringing civil rights actions and
would reduce fees below the level of the requisite "reasonable
82
fee." 8 1 The Eighth Circuit has continued to follow this standard.

78. See Senate Report, supra note 10, at 4, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS
5908, 5911 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enter, Inc., 390 U.S. 40, 402 (1968)). See also
Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 420.
79. See Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 421-22.
The legislative history supports the proposition that fees should be awarded for matters
on which the plaintiff does not prevail. The Senate Report, supra note 10, at 6,reprintedin
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 5908, 5913, states that the Johnson factors were correctly
applied in Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), Davis v. County of Los
9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974), and Swann v. CharlotteAngeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975). See supra note 15 for an outline of
the Johnson factors.
The Davis court awarded fees for a "certain limited amount of time [spent] pursuing
certain issues of fact and law [unidentified by the court] that ultimately did not become
litigated issues in the case or upon which plaintiffs ultimately did not prevail," on the basis
that "all time reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved should be
compensated in the same manner that an attorney traditionally is compensated by a feepaying client for all time reasonably expended on a matter." 8 Empl. Prac. Dec (CCH), at
5049.
In StanfordDaily, plaintiffs successfully argued that they were entitled to attorney's fees
for time spent litigating a motion for a preliminary injunction that was denied. In its
analysis of the fees issue, the court stated that fees should only be "den[ied] for clearly
meritless claims but granted] ... for legal work reasonably calculated to advance [the
party's] clients' interests ...[C]ourts should not require attorneys (often working in new or
changing areas of the law) to divine the exact parameters of the courts' willingness to grant
relief." 64 F.R.D. at 684. In support of this conclusion, the court cited Locklin v. Day-Glo
Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1970Xattorney's fees for legal services which appeared
unnecessary in hindsight, but which were clearly not manufactured, were allowed).
80. 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978).
81. Id. at 637.
82. See, e.g., Reproductive Health Serv. v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 449 U.S. 809 (1980). See also Crain v. City of Mountain
Home, 611 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1979); Cleverly v. Western Elec., 594 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1979). In
Reproductive Health Serv., plaintiffs prevailed on their claim that a Missouri regulation
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In Northcross v. Board of Education,8 3 a Sixth Circuit case,
plaintiffs sought fees for their work in a Memphis school desegregation case which had been litigated continuously for nineteen
years. During this time, several variations of desegregation plans
had been adopted. The district court awarded only partial fees on
the ground that the scope of the plans ultimately adopted was not
as broad as that originally sought by plaintiffs. The court of
appeals reversed, holding that all attorney time was compensable
84
even though the plaintiffs did not prevail in every respect.
In Rivera v. City of Riverside,8 5 a police misconduct suit involving both federal civil rights and pendent state claims, the amount
of attorney's fees awarded by the district court greatly exceeded
the amount of damages awarded the prevailing plaintiffs. 86 On
appeal the defendants sought to reduce the fees, relying in part on
the contention that the plaintiffs had succeeded on less than all of
their claims and against less than all of the defendants. The Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument and noted that to rule otherwise
would discourage innovative litigation. 87
Unlike the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, other federal cir-

violated a governing federal statute (although the scope of relief was restricted), but did not
prevail on their substantive constitutional claim in the district court. They were nevertheless awarded fees for all time expended under the Brown principle. The Eighth Circuit found
no abuse of discretion in this award. Reproductive Health Serv. is a stronger case than
Brown because one can argue that plaintiff Brown was a catalyst in defendants' abandonment of the allegedly unconstitutional statute under which she was fired, and the court had
previously indicated that the circumstances surrounding Brown's discharge "implicate[d]
substantive due process considerations." Brown, 588 F.2d at 636. In Reproductive Health
Serv., plaintiffs unequivocally failed to prevail on their constitutional issue in the district
court. But see Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1980), a stockholder's derivative action,
in which time spent on "unfruitful legal theories" (in this case a claim that information on
"Star Wars" was not made available) was compensable.
83. 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
84. Id. at 636. See also infra notes 132-50 and accompanying text.
85. 679 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1982).
86. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $33,350 in damages, and the court awarded them
$243,343.75 for attorneys fees and $2,112.50 in law clerk's fees. Id. at 796.
87. Id. at 797. The court noted that all of plaintiffs' claims, lost or won, were related and
that plaintiffs had obtained the ultimate goal of their suit, damages. It was therefore
improper to fractionalize the case. The court recognized the Northcross argument, however,
and stated: "[T]raditional methods of attorney compensation based on fee-paying clients do
not differentiate between successful and unsuccessful claims." Id. Such methods do not
contemplate rebates to clients for lost claims. Nevertheless, the court was unconvinced by
defendants' argument that the fees awarded were disproportionate to the result obtained.
Congress, after all, had not put a ceiling on the amount of fees awardable. In fact, fees may
be awarded even where no damages are contemplated. The amount of the award is, therefore, within the sound discretion of the district court. Id. at 798.
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cuits have decided that under section 1988 fees are awardable only
for certain parts of a case. These courts have proceeded on the
assumption that the fees awarded should be proportional to the
number of claims, issues, or causes of action actually won.8 8 . In

applying a proportionality test, however, the courts have had difficulty defining exactly where to draw the line between compensable
and noncompensable categories of claims.
In Gurule v. Wilson,8 9 the Tenth Circuit stated that "A technical
dissection of the course of litigation and a mechanical proportionate reduction of the total fee is not in keeping with either the
express intent of Congress or the broad remedial purpose of the
Civil Rights Acts." 90 Yet the court on rehearing retreated from this
position, asserting that a court may proportionately reduce a
requested fee "for time spent on substantially separate issues
which a plaintiff raises but on which he does not prevail." 91 An
opposite equivocation occurred in Jones v. Diamond,92 where the
Fifth Circuit initially adopted a proportionality test but in a modified opinion awarded fees for all attorney time expended. 93 The
court explained that the plaintiff s failure to obtain a judgment on
every issue or claim asserted should not automatically require a
94
denial of attorney's fees for time spent pursuing such claims.

The Gurule and Jones decisions demonstrate the difficulty of
developing a court-created rule that is easily applied and that
awards "reasonable" fees in a manner that the statute intends. 95

88. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Lamphere v.
Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1979). These cases disallowed fees where there was a
"truly fractionable claim" on which the plaintiff did not prevail. Compare the "related
claims" standard of Rivera v. City of Riverside, 679 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1982) with Miller v.
Carson, 628 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1980) (apportionment of fees is proper only when the plaintiff
has several "distinct causes of action" and has succeeded on some). See also Robinson v.
Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1981), holding that if the plaintiff prevailed on the overall
claim, "issue parcels" on which the plaintiff did not prevail were compensable. However,
fees may not be awarded on "unmeritorious claims" (determined by hindsight).
89. 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir.), on reh'g, 635 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980).
90. Id. at 793-94.
91. Id. at 794.
92. 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979), modified, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981).
93. 636 F.2d at 1382.
94. Id.
95. The statutory language mandates a "reasonable fee" and the legislative history
approves the application of the Johnson factors when applied as a set. However, courts

have focused on the eighth Johnson factor, the amount involved and the results obtained,
and have neglected to consider the set of factors as a whole. Thus, fees are generally not
awarded in the same manner as fee-paying clients are billed. See Wheeler v. Durham City
Bd. of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 27,32 (W.D.N.C. 1980).
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Application of the proportionality test in complex civil rights cases
has been so confused as to engender further litigation on the same
claims. The Third Circuit, in an attempt to avoid such confusion,
has employed a proportionality test which analyzes the question of
who is the "prevailing party" separately with respect to each
claim. 96 Fees are then awarded only for each claim on which the
party prevails. Such a test, one might argue, undermines the intent
of Congress to award prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys "reasonable"
fees and discourages the private enforcement of civil rights
violations.
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit test first identifies the prevailing
party and then establishes "all time reasonably spent" as well as
fees traditionally paid by a "fee-paying client."9 7 This method of
calculation insures that private attorneys general receive a
marketplace return on their good faith efforts. The result is not left
to guesswork or unnecessary further litigation, and better promotes the purposes underlying section 1988 awards.
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH

Despite apparent difficulties, the Seventh Circuit has adopted a
98
proportionality test to determine fee awards in civil rights cases.

96. See Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978). In Wheeler the district court
recognized the confusion inherent in applying the Hughes analysis:
As Judge Peck recognized in Northcross, it is apparent that there is some
confusion in the cases between the idea of prevailing on issues in order to be a
"prevailing party" and entitled to attorney's fees at all, and the idea that the
award should be proportionate to the extent of the recovery.
Id. at 36.
97. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. This assumes that fees should not be
awarded for frivolous or groundless claims. See, e.g. Swanson v. American Consumer
Indus., 517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975) (district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
compensation for collateral and pendent claims which were "unfounded and extravagent").
98. Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1981); Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577 (7th
Cir. 1980); Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Co., 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974); Williams v. General
Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974). See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Muscare and notes 114-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of Busche.
Batiste and Williams, two earlier Title VII cases, are not cited in any of the subsequent
§ 1988 cases. These cases followed the general rule that "the amount of an award of attorney's
fees should be proportionate to the extent to which the plaintiff prevailed in the suit."
Williams, 492 F.2d at 409. It is not clear whether this rule refers to the amount of money
recovered or whether it refers to the number of issues or claims on which plaintiff prevailed.
The Seventh Circuit recognized the basic principle of § 1988 to compensate plaintiffs'
attorneys for all reasonable time in an analogous context in Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231,
1236 (7th Cir. 1980)(Bond IV), where fees were awarded for appellate work and time spent
litigating the fee issue:
[I]nherent in the policy of the Fees Act is a congressional judgment that
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The Seventh Circuit's formulation of the proportionality test

encouragement of civil rights claims and actions through fee awards to prevailing
plaintiffs and the consequent deterrence of civil rights violations presumably
fostered by these actions are of greater weight than the hypothetical reluctance of
defendants to pursue potentially meritorious objections (to fee awards) for fear of
having to pay additional attorney's fees in the event their arguments prove
unsuccessful."
Indeed, it is plaintiff, acting as a private attorney general, who is deterred from bringing
"potentially meritorious" claims if time spent on those which are ultimately unsuccessful is
not compensable.
Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979), held that a party need not win "on all the
contested issues to be considered a 'prevailing party."' Id. at 79. The Dawson court, citing
with approval Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), determined that the plaintiffs in Dawson were a "catalyst" prompting the defendants to institute
fair employment practices, and reaffirmed the spirit of the Fees Act that fees should be
awarded "almost as a matter of course." 600 F.2d at 79. In addition, in Davis v. Murphy, 587
F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1978), the court confirmed that under the Act fees should be awarded for
appellate work as well as for trial work. Id. at 364-65.
The cases cited above indicate the broad scope which the Seventh Circuit has accorded
the Fees Act in its decisions except for, and in stark contrast to, those which have employed
the proportionality test.
The first case decided by the Seventh Circuit under the Fees Act was Bond v. Stanton,
555 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977) (Bond III), which was remanded by the Supreme Court on the
question of fees in light of the then just enacted Fees Act. Bond v. Stanton (Bond II), 528
F.2d 688 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded for further consideration, 429 U.S. 973 (1976).
Bond III held that the eleventh amendment is no bar to an award of fees and that the Act,
as provided for in the legislative history, is applicable to a pending case, even one which has
disposed of all issues except fees. 555 F.2d at 174. See also Gautreaux v. C.H.A., No. 81-2223,
slip op. (7th Cir. Aug. 30,1982). The Seventh Circuit had originally affirmed the district
court's award of fees against state officials in their capacity on the basis of bad faith. The
constitutional issue raised by the defendants was that the eleventh amendment immunized
these officials from the fee award. The Seventh Circuit held that the Fees Act was enacted
pursuant to the "enforcement provisions" of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, thereby
overriding any state sovereignty restrictions. This interpretation was later confirmed by the
Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
The Senate Report, citing Newman with approval, provides in substance that once a
plaintiff is determined to have prevailed, fees shall not be denied unless special circumstances
exist. Senate Report, supra note 10, at 4, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 5908,
5912. The Seventh Circuit has ruled that a unit of local government is not exempt from an
award of fees as a special circumstance, Entertainment Concepts, Inc. III v. Maciejewski,
631 F.2d 497,507 (7th Cir. 1980); neither are attorneys who are employed by legal services or
non-profit public interest firms or agencies. Custom v. Quern, 482 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The defendants' good faith is
not a ground to deny fees. Entertainment Concepts, Inc. III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497
(7th Cir. 1980). See also E. LARSON, supra note 13, at 46. The size of the award is not necessarily determinative of whether or what fees shall be awarded. Rivera v. City of Riverside, 679
F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1982); Milwe v. Caruoto, 653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981); Skoda v. Fontani, 646
F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1981); Coop v. City of South Bend, 635 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1980). That a
plaintiff may prevail only on his statutory pendent claims is not a circumstance to deny
fees. Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1979); Seals v. Quarterly
County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 174 (7th
Cir. 1977); Harradine v. Board of Supervisors, 425 N.Y.S.2d 182 (App. Div. 1980). But see
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evolved from Muscare v. Quinn,99 which addressed two claims:
first, that a Chicago Fire Department grooming regulation was
unconstitutional, and second, that the plaintiff was denied procedural due process after he was charged with violating the regulation. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari on the claim
involving the substantive violation, but later dismissed the petition because the defendant had changed its regulation and because
of an intervening Supreme Court opinion adversely affecting the

Bunting v. City of Columbia, 639 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1981).
In Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit awarded attorney's
fees under the Fees Act even though damages were recovered. Id. at 18. The circuits seem to
have split on this question. The Second Circuit in Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.
1978) (cf. Milwe v. Caruoto, 653 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1981)) and the Ninth Circuit in Buxton v.
Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979) (cf. Rivera v. City of Riverside, 679 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.
1982)) have denied fees where damages have been awarded. These courts reason that fee
generating cases render one Fees Act policy, providing adequate representation to the poor,
irrelevant. This is sometimes referred to as the "bright prospects" standard. The First
Circuit in Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978), and the Fifth Circuit in Gibbs v.
Frisco City, 626 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1980), have rejected this reasoning. Although the
Seventh Circuit in Konczak and Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1981), implied
strongly that § 1988 fees should not be denied when damages are recovered, the Seventh
Circuit put the issue to rest recently in Sanchez v. Schwartz, No. 81-2509, slip op. at 3 (7th
Cir. Sept. 13, 1982). The Sanchez court also resolved, for the Seventh Circuit, whether a
contingent fee agreement sets "an automatic ceiling on the amount of a statutory award" by
stating: "We also decline to hold that where a contingent fee contract has been executed, it
serves as an automatic ceiling on the amount of a statutory award. Such a rule is less rigid
than the 'bright prospects' standard, and it does not so persistently undercompensate civil
rights plaintiffs. But it is equally unsupported in the legislative history." Id. at 4. Zarcone
and Buxton are likewise at odds with the legislative history and rely on hindsight to
determine the merits of a fee award. Both cases, however, have been narrowed by their
respective circuits in later decisions.
The ability of the defendant or plaintiff to pay fees provides no special circumstances
justifying the denial or reduction of fees. EntertainmentConcepts, 631 F.2d at 507 (ability of
defendants to pay); Milwe v. Caruoto, 653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981); ISKCON v. Collins, 609
F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1980) (ability of plaintiffs to pay). Likewise, the resources of the law firm
representing the prevailing plaintiff are not a special circumstance for denying fees.
Witherspoon v. Sielaff, 507 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ill. 1981). However, the Seventh Circuit has
denied fees to an attorney who submitted a grossly inflated bill. Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d
1057 (7th Cir. 1980). Since a court has supervisory responsibility over attorneys practicing
before it, the fees denied in Brown could be seen as a sanction against the attorney without
reference to the Fees Act or special circumstances. Generally, courts agree that reasonable
fees should be awarded at the prevailing or market rate for the work performed. Copeland v.
Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(en banc); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig. 84
F.R.D. 246 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
In Balark v. Curtin, 655 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1981), the Seventh Circuit extended the
principle first enunciated in Bond IV that fees are recoverable for litigating fees:
We find this case indistinguishable in principle from Bond. Plaintiff seeks fees
for her efforts to collect the judgment awarded her in her successful action under
the civil rights laws. Congress has determined that attorneys' fees are necessary
to fulfill the purposes of the civil rights laws by transferring the costs of litigation
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substantive issue. 100 Muscare subsequently prevailed on his procedural due process claim in the district court and was awarded
fees accordingly. The court, however, denied fees for the time spent
on the substantive claim.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that fees should be
awarded only for the procedural due process claim. In its analysis,
the court discussed Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co.,101 a Seventh Circuit Title VII case, in which the plaintiff established sex
discrimination in salary level and recovered backpay.10 2 The
to those who infringe upon basic civil rights, Bond, 630 F.2d at 1235. The
compensatory goals of the civil rights laws would thus be undermined if fees were
not also available when defendants oppose the collection of civil rights judgments.
An award of compensation for injuries sustained as a result of unconstitutional
state action would be "diluted" if fees were denied to plaintiffs required to contest
substantial efforts to resist or obstruct the collection of civil rights judgments. The
victory would be hollow if plaintiffs were left with a paper judgment not
negotiable into cash except by undertaking burdensome and uncompensated
litigation.
Balark v. Curtin, 655 F.2d at 803. See also Gary W. v. Louisiana, 622 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980)
(fees for collecting judgment for fees compensable).
The court's heavy reliance on the legislative history is apparent from other fee decisions
as well. Skoda v. Fontani, 646 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1981); Coop v. City of South Bend, 635 F.2d
652 (7th Cir. 1980); Entertainment Concepts, Inc. III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.
1980). The award should be made at current rather than historic rates, thus accounting for
inflation and other market increases or decreases. Bonner v. Coughlin, 657 F.2d 931 (7th Cir.
1981). This approach avoids the necessity of time consuming and complicated calculations
and also serves to stabilize and regularize fee awards. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.,
84 F.R.D. 246 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
Other issues include: a) availability of a bonus or multiplier. Mills v. Eltra Corp. (Appeal
of Mozart Ratner), 663 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1981); Kamberos v. G.T.E. Automatic Elec., Inc.,
603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979); Strama v. Peterson, 541 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Ill. 1982); b) what
costs or expenses should be awarded: Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979);
Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1979); c) what role the attorney's contract plays in
the awarding of fees: Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978). See also Sanchez v.
Schwartz, No. 81-2509, slip op. (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 1982).
99. 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980).
100. Cf. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980), a case similar to this one in
many respects. Plaintiffs in Gurule succeeded during settlement negotiations in convincing
the defendant prison administrators to adopt a new procedural manual. Before the final
disposition, however, three intervening Supreme Court cases held that it was not
constitutionally necessary to adopt the new procedures. Nonetheless, defendants retained
the procedures. When determining the availability of attorney's fees, the Tenth Circuit
decided that the plaintiffs had prevailed on this issue because they were catalysts for the
defendant's adoption of the manual. In Muscare, the Chicago Fire Department changed its
regulations and represented to the Supreme Court that it was "very doubtful" it would
discard the new procedures even if Muscare did not prevail. Id. at 578. It would seem that
Muscare should also have been considered a catalyst. See also Harrington v. DeVito, 656
F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. DeVito v. Harrington, 102 S. Ct. 1621 (1982),
for the Seventh Circuit's use of the "catalyst" test.
101. 596 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1979).
102. Id. at 187.
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defendant, at the same time, succeeded in defeating the plaintiffs
additional claim that her replacement and demotion were discriminatory. The Seventh Circuit considered the case a "draw," reasoning that the defendant's defeat of plaintiff's second claim was
equivalent to plaintiffs victory on the first. 10 3 The court ruled that
the plaintiffs victory was, therefore, cancelled for the purpose of a
fee award.10 4 Although the Muscare court declined to follow Roesel's "cancellation" approach, it reached the same result. The court
compared the procedural claim that Muscare won with the substantive claim lost and concluded that the procedural victory was
not the "main part" of the case. Thus, the plaintiff was not
awarded full fees because he had not prevailed on his substantive
claim, notwithstanding that under applicable precedent and legislative history he was the prevailing party. 10 5
The Muscare decision established what has become accepted
law in the Seventh Circuit. 10 6 Attorney's fees are awarded only on

103. The court's reasoning was erroneous because, under the proper statutory analysis,
once the plaintiff is determined to have succeeded on a significant issue, and thus to be the
prevailing party, fees are to be awarded regardless of whether the defendant succeeded in
defeating another of plaintiffs claims. See Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 79 (7th Cir.
1979), where it was held that when the plaintiff prevailed "in a practical sense" as a
"catalyst prompting the defendants to institute fair employment practices" fees were
awardable.
104. No cases were cited in support of this proposition, however, nor is there any support
for such a position in the legislative history. According to relevant precedent, then, the
plaintiff should have been deemed the prevailing party because she "essentially succeeded"
on a significant issue in the litigation, and should have received fees for both claims. See
supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
105. Muscare,614 F.2d at 580. This narrow view of the "public benefit factor," listed both
in Waters and Johnson, directly conflicts with the whole notion of the private attorney
general theory and the mandate of Congress to provide access to resources to aggrieved
plaintiffs. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50. Therefore, this factor should not be
used at all. Since these cases are already brought in the public interest, a further determination on the issue is irrelevant, except perhaps on the question of a multiplier.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in deciding Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), had
affirmed the intrinsic value of procedural due process, the deprivation of which itself justifies a damage award. In the absence of actual damages to a plaintiff as a result of the
deprivation, nominal damages are awardable. Thus, the court could not have declared
Muscare a draw, as it did in Roesel (see supra text accompanying notes 101-04), because
Carey had emphasized the inherent value of procedural due process rights. By analyzing
Muscare the way it did, the court created a dangerous precedent which was later broadened
to encompass cases where the difference between winning and losing claims was not so
great.
106. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981), expanded and
reaffirmed Muscare. Syvock represents the leading circuit decision to date on the proportionality test. The Supreme Court has heard Hensley v. Eckerhart, 102 S. Ct. 1610 (1982),
this term. See infra text accompanying notes 118-27, 132-50 for a discussion of the case.
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the plaintiffs successful claims, and not on unsuccessful though
meritorious claims. 10 7 In determining the number of compensable
hours, each claim, as that term is defined in rule 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 108 is to be analyzed separately. If the
petitioner "essentially succeeded" on a claim, fees are awardable
for that claim only. 0 9 To the extent that a petitioner has been
0
unsuccessful on a claim, he is not a prevailing party."
The year following Muscare a different panel of the Seventh
Circuit took a distinctly different approach in analyzing the availability of fees. The plaintiff in Sherkow v. Wisconsin 10 1 prevailed
at trial on her Title VII claims of sex discrimination for failure to
promote and for unlawful retaliation. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the decision relative to substantive issues, but reversed
on the manner in which plaintiffs personnel records were to be
expunged. In light of this partial reversal, the defendant requested
that plaintiffs fees award be reduced. The court denied the request,
relying on the Sixth Circuit's Northcross decision"' which com107. Muscare, 614 F.2d at 580. Cited in support of this proposition was Dillon v. AFBIC
Dev. Corp., 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979), where fees were awarded to plaintiffs for prevailing
on their individual claim, but denied for "efforts on behalf of the class they represented,"
because the defendant "had committed no class violations." Id. at 564. Dillon represents a
situation where the statutory language itself required the result that obtained. The statute
mandates that fees be awarded to a "prevailing party." If there are multiple parties, only
one of whom prevailed, it would distort the statutory language to award fees to completely
different parties who did not prevail. That situation differs markedly from the one present
in Muscare, where there was only one party involved. When only one of many parties
receives a fee award, the nonprevailing parties who do not receive awards are not penalized.
Muscare, however, as the prevailing party, was nonetheless uncompensated for having
pursued his legal rights.
Also cited in Muscare was EEOC v. Safeway Stores, 597 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1979). The
court, without any analysis, upheld the district court's award and stated that the amount to
be awarded "depends upon the extent to which the plaintiff himself prevailed." Id. at 253.
See Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978), where plaintiffs prevailed on their discrimination claim, but lost on several other claims and "on their contention that the attorney's
fees issue was for the jury." Id. at 486.
108. Rule 10(b) provides as follows:
All averments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the
contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a statement of a
single set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all
succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or
defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set
forth.
FED. R. Ov. P. 10(b).
109. Hughes, 578 F.2d at 487.
110. Id.
110.1 630 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1980).
111. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979).
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pensated all plaintiff's attorney's time whether ultimately productive or nonproductive.' 12 Thus, the Sherkow court abandoned its
own circuit's approach as defined in Muscare and adopted one
which would produce results more in keeping with the congressional purpose behind section 1988.113
In 1980, the Seventh Circuit confronted this same issue in
Busche v. Burkee.1 1 4 The plaintiff in Busche was awarded substantial compensatory damages on his procedural due process
claim that the defendant had denied him a pretermination hearing. All his other claims failed. The Seventh Circuit nevertheless
held that Busche was the prevailing party because he had suc1 15
ceeded on a significant issue.
The court refused, however, to award fees for all attorney time as
the trial court had done. Instead, the court specifically rejected the
Northcross rule of full compensation because it conflicted with
Muscare. The court declared that the "amount of attorneys fees
[prevailing plaintiffs] receive should be based on the work performed on the issues in which they were successful."' " 6 Although
Sherkow was not mentioned in Busche and therefore not expressly
overruled, its reasoning appears completely discredited by Busche's
17
explicit disapproval of Northcross.
In Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co.,'1 8 the Seventh Circuit
attempted to reconcile Muscare, Sherkow and Busche. Syvock
brought his action under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act '1 9 alleging that his layoff and his employer's failure to rehire
him were discriminatory. The jury found a willful violation of the
Act. The district court refused to award fees for all time expended,
however, reasoning that it must first apply the objective factors set

112. The Northcross court explained: "We know of no traditional method of billing
whereby an attorney offers a discount based upon his or her failure to prevail on issues or
parts of issues." Id. at 636.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 23-54.
114. 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 521. The court adopted the First Circuit's definition of "prevailing party" as
set forth in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978): "plaintiffs may be considered
'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Id. at
278-79.
116. 649 F.2d at 522 (quoting Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 279).
117. Busche recognized, however, that overlap problems can develop. The plaintiff
should get fees for services related to winning claims. See also Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d
997 (5th Cir. 1979).
118. 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981).
119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976) (amended 1978).
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forth in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works' 20 and then apply the
proportionality test approved in Muscare.121 Consequently, the
compensable hours were cut in half under the Waters factors, and
then further reduced under Muscare because the plaintiff had not
prevailed on certain aspects of his claim.122 The court of appeals
reversed the reduction based on Muscare, stating that Muscare
had brought two independent claims whereas Syvock "has presented only one claim: that Milwaukee Boiler discriminated against
him because of age. Syvock prevailed on this claim and therefore is
entitled to his reasonable attorney's fees. ....-,23
The court attempted to reconcile the cases on the ground that the
fees in each case were awarded for claims on which the plaintiff
prevailed.1 24 In Muscare the,plaintiff prevailed on a "minor" procedural due process claim, while in Sherkow the plaintiff won both
of her substantive claims and was reversed on a minor procedural
matter. 125 In Busche the plaintiff brought three claims and only
succeeded in proving one, for which he was awarded fees.1 26 From
the foregoing facts the Seventh Circuit derived the rule that fees
can be denied for failure to prevail on a separate claim, but must be
awarded under section 1988 if the plaintiff fails to prevail merely
127
on an "aspect" of a larger claim.
The reconciliation of cases in Syvock, though factually sound, is
incomplete in that the court never adequately addressed the rule of
law announced in Northcross and followed in Sherkow1 28 By
assuming that the question of fees should be handled by ascertaining the "prevailing party" on a claim by claim basis, the court has
sidestepped the legislative purpose of section 1988. The Syvock rule
requires a court to decide which claims are compensable through

120. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
121.

See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.

122. 665 F.2d at 162.
123. Id. at 163. Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978), was used to buttress the
court's position. Syvock had essentially succeeded just as the plaintiffs in Hughes had.
124. 665 F.2d at 164. The court also attempted to reconcile Northcross and Muscare by
reasoning that the plaintiff in Northcross had lost on the issue of the scope of the remedy
rather than on a completely separate claim, and thus Northcross did not explicitly prohibit
a proportional approach. Id. at 165 n.23.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105, 111-13.
126. The Syvock'court never mentioned that the claim on which Busche prevailed also
involved substantial compensatory damages, which had underscored the fee award in that
case. Busche, 649 F.2d at 519, 521.
127. 665 F.2d at 165.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 14

post hoc reasoning and hindsight. 129 A claim colorable when
brought may ultimately fail due to unforeseen contingencies. By
denying fees for such claims, the rule penalizes plaintiffs' attorneys for vigorously promoting their clients' rights and bringing
claims which may be somewhat risky, but nonetheless valid.
Policy matters aside, the practical application of Syvock in later
cases may prove difficult. Most courts that employ a proportionality test presently rely on the eighth factor outlined in Johnson,the
amount involved and the result obtained, 130 to the exclusion of
other relevant factors. The Seventh Circuit seems to have approved
a two-step proportionality test in Syvock, condoning the application of both Waters and Johnson factors to reduce compensable
fees as well as the prevailing claim standard of Muscare.13' This
may presage the eventual formulation of a strict two-step process,
and a consequent double reduction of fees. Finally, Syvock is troubling because it attempts to reconcile the facts of previous Seventh
Circuit cases without addressing whether the law expounded in all
of these cases is reconcilable.
Under the proportionality test of Syvock, then, a civil rights suit
involving multiple constitutional claims, substantial and meritorious when brought but not equally successful, could compel a double reduction of fees. The court would first consider the results
obtained, among other factors, to reduce the award and then
further reduce fees to reflect the plaintiff's failure to prevail on all
claims. The attorney, who could have expended more time on the
losing than the winning claim, would not recover anything for
pursuing the unsuccessful claim. Thus, under the present state of
the law in the Seventh Circuit, a civil rights attorney, in order to
receive reasonable fees, might better frame his case around one
large claim that is likely to succeed and subsume all other "issues"
under it.
HENSLEY V ECKERHART
In 1982, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hensley v. Eck32 the disposition of which should resolve
erhart,1
some of the prob-

129. Cf. Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1970), where the Seventh
Circuit disapproved such post hoc reasoning.
130. See supra notes 15, 98.
131. For a description of Waters and Johnson factors, see supra note 15.
132. 102 S. Ct. 1610 (1982).
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lems presented by the proportionality test. In Eckerhart v. Hensley, 3 3 the plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the constitutionality under the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the program of care and treatment provided to patients in a state hospital's forensic unit. The district court found that a constitutional
right to treatment does exist, but that such a right encompasses
only treatment "minimally adequate to provide [the patient] a
reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition."' 13 Several aspects of the physical environment did not meet
this standard. 35 The court found that staffing procedures and
individual treatment plans were minimally adequate, but held that
delay in preparation of the plans created constitutional inadequacy. 13 6 Certain conditions of a patient's confinement were held
violative of due process, as were certain visitation and telephone
policies. 137 Hospital practices which involved secluding patients
and physically restraining them were also held constitutionally
38
inadequate.1
A consent decree was entered to correct the lack of due process in
the manner in which patients were placed within the forensic unit.
In addition, while the case was pending, the defendants modified
certain aspects of their policies.13 9 The plaintiffs, however, failed
to receive court ordered relief on some aspects of their claims. The
defendants contended, therefore, that any fees awarded should be
proportional to the extent the plaintiffs had prevailed and that the
time spent on losing issues should not be compensated.1 40 The
district court rejected this argument in reliance on Brown v. Bathke:1 41 "Under [defendants' suggested] method no consideration is
given for the relative importance of various issues, the interrelation of the issues, the difficulty in identifying issues, or the extent
to which a party may prevail on various issues."1 42 Instead, fees

133. 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
134. Id. at 915.
135. Items such as inadequate climate control, bathrooms, dormitories, and furnishings
were among those that were inadequate. Id. at 917-19.
136. Id. at 920, 922.
137. Id. at 922-25.
138. Id. at 926-28.
139. Brief for the Respondents at 2-3 (June 1982).
140. Eckerhart v. Hensley, No. 75-Cr-87-C, slip op. at 6-7 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 1981).
141. 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978). See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
142. Eckerhart,No. 75-Cr-87-C, slip op. at 7.
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were awarded for virtually all time spent, 143 a decision which the
144
Eighth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam unreported decision.
In their brief to the Supreme Court, the petitioners have argued
that the Eighth Circuit should be reversed because "[t]he unsuccessful claims were fractionable from those claims on which Plaintiffs partially prevailed .... Consistent with sound public policy
attorneys for Plaintiffs should not be compensated for all time
expended on a case of multiple constitutional claims when they
prevailed only to an extremely limited degree."' 145 The petitioners
advocated that this policy be followed to avoid windfalls to plaintiffs and unnecessary overpleading. Furthermore, the petitioners
argued that unsuccessful research on alternative legal theories
supportive "of a specific claim for relief' should be compensated
only if the plaintiffs succeed on their underlying claim. 146 For petitioners to prevail on this argument, however, they must distinguish Brown. They attempt to do so by arguing that Brown
involved separate legal theories, not claims. Yet Brown did involve
separate claims of the same nature as those in Muscare: a due
process claim challenging inadequate procedures and a substan47
tive constitutional claim challenging a refusal to renew a contract.1
Respondents, on the other hand, have sought to characterize
Hensley as a case in which the plaintiffs actually did prevail on
virtually all claims and in which claims were inextricably interwoven.1 48 Thus, they have argued that the case does not present
the issue of whether fees should be proportioned to the extent the
plaintiffs prevailed. 149 Although the respondents have argued
that their claims are not fractionable, the Court must nevertheless
consider whether the proportionality test should be the measure of
compensation. In response to this issue, the Court should focus on
who the prevailing party is, rather than the extent to which he or
she has prevailed. Once the prevailing party is determined, fees
should be awarded for all meritorious and nonfrivolous claims as
15 0
the legislative intent and Supreme Court precedent require.
143. The only exception was that the court reduced the fees of an inexperienced plaintiffs attorney because he had failed to keep contemporaneous time records. Id. at 13-14.
144. Eckerhart v. Hensley, No. 81-1227, slip op. (8th Cir. Sept. 28, 1981).
145. Brief for the Petitioners at 22 (May, 1982).
146. Id. at 32.
147.

See supra text accompanying notes 80-82, 99-100.

148. Brief for the Respondents at 17-32 (June, 1982).
149. Id. at 32-46. In other respects, their argument is similar to that presented in this
article.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 23-54.
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CONCLUSION

Vigorous advocacy and commitment to the redress of civil rights
violations are hallmarks of the legal profession. Paramount to all
our interests is the protection of our constitutional democracy.
These objectives are hindered by court decisions that decline to
compensate the good faith and meritorious efforts of attorneys in
their role as private attorneys general.
In enacting section 1988, Congress directed that attorneys who
expend time and effort prosecuting alleged federal law breakers be
reasonably compensated. Congress could have imposed limitations on fee awards other than those specified in section 1988.151
The congressional intent on this point is clearly stated in the
Senate Report: "In computing the fee, counsel for prevailing parties should be paid as is traditional with attorneys compensated by
52
a fee-paying client, 'for all time reasonably expended on a matter."'
Fee paying clients "traditionally" do not pay in proportion to what
is won or lost. Thus, it appears a "public interest discount"1 5 3 has
crept into the analysis of those cases failing to award fees for valid,
though unsuccessful, claims.
The proper approach for the courts to take in awarding reasonable fees is to decide whether the plaintiff is the prevailing party
and then to determine whether special circumstances exist to deny
or reduce fees. The analysis should not be encumbered thereafter
by a proportionality test. Rather, the same standard applied by
Justice Stewart in Christiansburgfor awarding fees to prevailing
defendants in a Title VII case should be applied to section 1988
awards:
[Ilt is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail,

151. Recently, for instance, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976) to provide for an
award of fees "against the United States or any agency thereof." Equal Access to Justice
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a), (d)(1)(A) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The statute is quite specific as
to the limitations on the award of fees. Fees are awardable only to the prevailing party other
than the United States. If the court finds that the government's position was substantially
justified, fees will be denied. Id. § 2412 (d)(1XA). A party is defined as someone whose net
worth is less than $1,000,000. Id. § 2412 (d)(2XB). Congress limited the rate of compensation
to no more than $75 per hour (id. § 2412 (d)(2XA)) and provided that fees can be denied if
"special circumstances [exist to] make an award unjust." Id. § 2412 (d)(1XA).
152. Senate Report, supra note 10, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws
5908,5913.
153. Berger, supra note 6, at 311.
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his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but
the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective
plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest
one's belief that he has been the victim of discrimination,
no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the
outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive
facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may
change or clarify in the midst of litigation. Even when the
law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the
outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for
bringing suit.154
Following this standard would not, as Senator Kennedy pointed
out during the Senate debates, result in a windfall for plaintiffs'
lawyers. 5 5 First, compensating those whos' best efforts are used
to vindicate constitutional rights cannot be considered a windfall.
Congress and the courts have found civil rights sufficiently important to impose damages for their violation. Surely it is equally
important to compensate plaintiffs' represefftatives adequately for
their time.
Second, the existence of the "nonfrivolous claim" standard is
adequate to protect defendants against avaricious attorneys who
would manipulate disinterested plaintiffs into bringing suit. A
standard that looks to the prevailing party and his or her meritor-

154. 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978). The authorization of interim fees or fees pendente lite
suggests strongly that any proportionality test is unjustified and contravenes the legislative
intent. The Senate Report specifically approves fees pendente lite, Senate Report, supra note
10, at 5, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908,5912, as does the House Report,
H.R. REP. No. 1558,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8. The Court approved in principle the awarding of
fees pendente lite in Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980): "[A]wards of counsel fees
pendente lite would be 'especially appropriate where a party has prevailed on an important
matter in the course of litigation, even when he ultimately does not prevail on all issues."'
Id. at 757-58.
The Fifth Circuit in James v. Stackham Valves & Fitting Co., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
7842 (5th Cir. 1977) stated:
There is a danger that litigants will be discouraged from bringing such suits
because of the risks of protracted litigation and the extended financial drain
represented by such a risk. An award of interim fees will prevent extreme cashflow problems for plaintiffs and their attorneys .... Otherwise, the danger exists
that defendants in Title VII suits may be tempted to seek victory through an
economic war of attrition against the plaintiff.
Id. at 6199. Logically, there is no difference in the policy of awarding interim fees and
awarding fees for all time reasonably spent on a matter. Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys' good
faith efforts even on issues or parts of issues lost should be fairly compensated.
155. See supra text accompanying note 45.

1982]

Section 1988 Fee Awards

29

ious claims is not only well-established and relatively clear but
objective. It compensates for all time reasonably expended on an
entire case, provided the plaintiff prevails. The "temptation to
engage in post hoc reasoning" is thus avoided. Moreover, this
standard is ascertainable in advance of litigation, affording attorneys reasonable certainty that their good faith efforts will be
rewarded fairly.
Hensley v. Eckerhart,now before the Court, provides the vehicle
through which the Court can reaffirm its longstanding commitment
to the private enforcement of civil rights. By affirming the Eighth
Circuit and conclusively rejecting a proportionality test, the Court
would be rejecting a highly discretionary formula in favor of an
objective measure for awarding fees under section 1988.

